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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 It is sometimes said that mutual dissatisfaction is the hallmark of a fair compromise.  
If so, the District Court achieved it here:  David Goldrich appeals the Court’s order 
requiring him to pay certain of Jersey City’s expenses and attorneys’ fees as a sanction for 
his repeated refusals to provide discovery; and Jersey City cross-appeals the Court’s denial 
of certain other expenses in connection with its efforts to procure that sanction.  Because 
neither ruling constituted an abuse of discretion, we will affirm.  
A. Discussion1 
We treat a district court’s “decision to impose sanctions for discovery violations and 
any determination as to what sanctions are appropriate a[s] matters generally entrusted to 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and 
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.   
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[its] discretion.”  Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 538 (3d Cir. 
2007) (citation omitted), amended on reh’g (Mar. 8, 2007).  We therefore apply the 
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard of review and disturb such orders only if the ruling 
was based “on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 
evidence.”  Id. (citation omitted).  In this case, there was no such error.   
Goldrich contends that the District Court should have denied the City’s expenses 
and fees request because the Court declined to give an adverse-inference instruction after 
“the subject spoliated evidence was not used at trial by either party.”  Appellant Br. 18 
(emphasis omitted).  But the District Court’s order that Goldrich “pay [] reasonable 
expenses, including attorney’s fees,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2), was a sanction for his failure 
to “obey an order to provide or permit discovery,” id., regardless of any failure to “take 
reasonable steps to preserve [electronically stored information],”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(e).  
Thus, there was no reason for the District Court to limit its sanctions order to “measures 
no greater than necessary to cure the prejudice” to the City “from loss of the information.”  
Id.  
 In the alternative, Goldrich urges that a reduction of the award is required by 
Supreme Court precedent because the City’s sanctions motion met with only some “degree 
of success.”  Appellant Br. 17 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436 (1983)).  
Specifically, he points out the District Court declined its requests for a finding that Goldrich 
committed fraud on the court or for the lawsuit to be dismissed.  But, if anything, Hensley 
undercuts his argument:  It specifies that “the fee award should not be reduced simply 
because the [movant] failed to prevail on every contention raised,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 
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435.  Rather, “[t]he result is what matters,” id., and here, the City persuaded the District 
Court to impose sanctions on Goldrich—a positive result.      
The City, for its part, argues that over and above the reimbursement ordered by the 
District Court of its forensic expert, its legal work related to the sanctions motion, and its 
legal work related to the sanctions hearing, it is also entitled to recover its “fees or costs 
relating to pre-motion letters, ESI Discovery, ESI depositions or post-hearing briefing.”  
Appellee Br. 19.  The Court reasonably concluded, however, that these additional expenses 
for work before and after the sanctions motion and concerning discovery generally were 
beyond the scope of the motion itself.  And, unlike the City, we do not read the Court’s 
post-trial order permitting “defense counsel [to] move to recover attorneys’ fees and costs 
relating to ESI discovery, their computer forensic expert, and their motion for sanctions for 
Plaintiff’s spoliation of evidence,” A1812, as implicitly modifying and enlarging its 
original sanctions order that limited fees to the sanctions motion, see A7.   
While we are not unsympathetic to the arguments of the City that the District Court 
certainly could have concluded, given the egregiousness of Goldrich’s discovery 
violations, that greater sanctions were warranted, we cannot say, reviewing only for abuse 
of discretion, that the sanction on which it settled was based “on an erroneous view of the 
law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”  Bowers, 475 F.3d at 538. 
B. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
